World
The strategic de-risking of Western economies from China has escalated into a reciprocal regulatory conflict, where China's new legal countermeasures directly target corporate compliance with Western policies, forcing a more complex and adversarial reassessment of economic dependencies.
The revelation of Chinese military researchers using US AI models for defence applications highlights new challenges in export control enforcement, while the UK court's approval of China's embassy project shows diplomatic infrastructure expansion despite economic de-risking.

The UK government's nationalisation of Chinese-owned British Steel marks a new phase in de-risking, extending beyond trade and technology controls to direct state intervention in heavy industry. London justified the decision by citing national interest, protecting domestic steel production, jobs, and supply for infrastructure and defence. Beijing has condemned this action as discriminatory, warning it will impact confidence in the UK as an investment destination and linking it to broader Western economic containment efforts.
Brussels continues to advance its Economic Security Strategy, including tighter outbound investment screening and coordinated export controls. The European Commission is preparing options to respond to China's use of its new legal toolkit, potentially including faster deployment of the EU Anti-Coercion Instrument and more assertive use of trade-defence tools. France and Germany are coordinating to draft a joint roadmap on China trade imbalances, prepared by their economy, finance and foreign ministers ahead of a presentation in September. This roadmap will focus on addressing trade imbalances, enhancing industrial competitiveness, and strategic de-risking, signalling a coordinated push for EU-level instruments rather than fragmented national responses. New proposals are emerging for a "structural caps" regime to limit single-country supply-chain dependencies, explicitly targeting over-reliance on Chinese exports by requiring EU companies to diversify sourcing of critical components. The EU is also intensifying trade defence against cheap Chinese electric vehicles and batteries, with new tariffs and other trade-defence measures under discussion or implementation, reflecting concerns over industrial overcapacity and its impact on EU manufacturers. New EU eco-design rules for textiles, which entered into force on 2026-07-19, ban large companies from destroying unsold or returned clothing and shoes. These rules will particularly affect fast fashion supply chains reliant on imports from Asia, including China, by forcing changes in inventory and returns management. The European Commission has proposed reforms to the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) to reduce immediate cost burdens on energy-intensive industries, aiming to balance industrial competitiveness and decarbonisation against competition from jurisdictions with looser climate rules. Germany is quietly mapping China's supply-chain vulnerabilities to identify potential leverage points in a trade conflict.
China continues to prioritize legal and export-control tools to safeguard critical technology amid Western semiconductor and EV curbs. Its commerce ministry stated in early 2026 that key priorities include strengthening legal frameworks, improving export controls, and enhancing risk-prevention to protect supply-chain resilience and national security. Chinese regulators have moved to operational enforcement of their countermeasures against Western semiconductor export controls, opening investigations into foreign chipmakers that reduced sales to Chinese clients. China has also expanded and updated its own export control lists for critical materials and technologies, such as certain rare earths and advanced battery inputs, linking these moves to Western restrictions. Chinese regulators have significantly reinforced oversight of overseas transactions involving Chinese technology and data, with new regulations giving Beijing broad powers to unwind completed deals and scrutinise foreign investments. China is also considering tighter limits on overseas access to its leading domestic AI models, potentially affecting both proprietary and open-weight systems. In a direct response to new EU sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong companies over Russia, China's Ministry of Commerce added 14 EU-based entities to its export control list, prohibiting the supply of Chinese-origin dual-use items to them. This action targets specific European firms including German defence group Rheinmetall AG, Italian motor maker Lafert S.p.A., and French research lab III-V LAB. Despite broader strategic rivalry, China and the United States signal selective cooperation on law enforcement, including mutual repatriation of criminal suspects and counter-narcotics efforts. Chinese authorities have intensified use of existing export control tools and security reviews targeting sectors where Western governments are actively de-risking, including advanced materials, critical minerals and dual-use components. Regulators are warning foreign companies against complying with foreign measures that restrict business with Chinese entities, forcing corporate legal departments to map potential conflicts of law. The Ministry of Commerce has also begun structured consultations with Chinese AI and semiconductor companies on tightening export controls over advanced technologies, suggesting Beijing is preparing further reciprocal measures that could affect key inputs and design support going to Western firms. A Chinese chipmaker is preparing a 66.5 billion yuan capital raise, Asia's largest to date, driven by AI chip demand, which underscores China's domestic capital mobilization to expand capacity despite Western export controls. The US is weighing sanctions on Chinese AI firm Moonshot over alleged misuse of US foundation models, prompting Beijing to threaten reciprocal restrictions against US tech firms. China's commerce ministry has warned of retaliation following new US import bans on Chinese industrial robots and power inverters, framing the measures as protectionist and undermining global supply chains. China's Ministry of Commerce sharply criticised the US Federal Communications Commission’s decision to add foreign-produced advanced robotic devices and power inverters to its “Covered List,” tightening US curbs on these Chinese-made technologies. China has tightened rare-earth export controls, raising stakes in the regulatory confrontation with Western de-risking efforts. Chinese companies are also preparing a wave of share buybacks to stabilize markets amid external pressures and a market downturn. While export-oriented sectors face pressure, Chinese AI hubs are experiencing rapid growth due to state support and focus on indigenous innovation. Chinese military researchers are extensively using US-developed frontier AI models for defence-related systems, exposing enforcement gaps in Western export controls and AI safety regimes.
China's Ministry of Commerce added 14 EU-based entities, including German defence group Rheinmetall AG, to its export control list. This move directly counters recent EU sanctions against Chinese and Hong Kong companies over Russia, prohibiting the supply of Chinese-origin dual-use items to these European firms.
The Trump administration replaced an expiring 10% global tariff with new levies of 10% and 12.5% on 60 trading partners, citing failures in forced labor enforcement. This action expands the scope of trade measures related to labor practices.
The UK government nationalised British Steel, owned by China's Jingye Group, citing national security, protection of critical industrial capacity, and safeguarding jobs. This action is viewed as an escalation in de-risking from China.
The US President declassified intelligence claiming China illicitly acquired 220 million US voter records, ordering a new FBI investigation into the matter. This action introduces election integrity concerns into US-China relations.
The UK government took Chinese-owned British Steel into full public ownership, framing the move as necessary to protect national interests, jobs, and defence-linked supply chains, marking a direct state intervention in a strategic asset.
The UK government announced it will take British Steel into public ownership after its Chinese owner signalled plans to shut blast furnace capacity. Officials framed the move as necessary to protect domestic steel production, safeguard jobs, and ensure national supply for major infrastructure and defence projects.
China's Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs issued a joint order suspending all helium exports with immediate effect, tightening control over a critical input for semiconductors, medical imaging, and aerospace.
The United States declined to extend the USMCA trade agreement, triggering a decade-long sunset period for North America’s economic framework. This decision will subject the agreement to annual review until 2036.
Chinese regulators have begun investigations into foreign chipmakers that reduced sales to Chinese clients, citing April’s Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security and the 2021 anti-sanctions law framework.
China's Ministry of Commerce issued additional prohibition orders under its blocking rules, barring entities in China from complying with recent US and EU export curbs on advanced semiconductor equipment. This expands on previous moves against US sanctions and an EU Foreign Subsidy Regulation case.
Chinese authorities invoked the Regulations on Countering Foreign Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to prevent a major wind turbine maker from cooperating with an EU anti-subsidy investigation, citing "illegal extraterritorial jurisdiction."
Beijing imposed immediate export restrictions on 20 Japanese entities, including Mitsubishi Shipbuilding, accusing Tokyo of pursuing a 'new type of militarism'. This action signals China's readiness to use trade tools in response to perceived security threats.
The European Commission formally confirmed provisional anti-subsidy duties on Chinese EV imports, with rates up to 48%. This decision follows earlier preliminary findings and escalates trade tensions between the EU and China.
Chinese authorities invoked the Regulations on Countering Foreign Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to prevent a domestic technology supplier from responding to an EU antitrust investigation. This marks the first reported use of these rules against an EU regulatory process.
China announced trade restrictions on dozens of US companies, including defense and aerospace firms, in retaliation for a Pentagon blacklist of Chinese entities. This action targets specific sectors in response to perceived foreign measures.
Chinese authorities used the Regulations on Countering Foreign Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to block a Chinese telecoms equipment maker from complying with an EU anti-subsidy investigation, forcing the European Commission to rely on available facts.
G7 leaders adopted a 60% import ceiling for rare earths and permanent magnets from any single supplier outside the group. This move aims to reduce dependence on China following last year's export restrictions and establish a new minerals alliance.
China brought into force Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security, allowing penalties for foreign companies that relocate production or significantly reduce purchases from Chinese suppliers. These rules provide a formal basis for retaliation against de-risking policies.
Chinese authorities utilized the Regulations on Countering Foreign Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction for the first time against the EU, ordering a domestic 5G equipment producer not to comply with an EU anti-subsidy investigation. This action creates a blocking statute against EU enforcement.
Chinese authorities used the Regulations on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction for the first time to block an EU Foreign Subsidy Regulation investigation into a Chinese company. This action marks a shift towards a broader blocking regime against Western regulatory measures.
China's Ministry of Justice issued its first formal blocking order under the new Countering Foreign Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Regulations, prohibiting compliance with an EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation investigation into Nuctech. This action directly obstructs an EU enforcement procedure.
China's plan to build a large new embassy complex in London has cleared a major UK court challenge and can proceed. This development allows consolidation of diplomatic functions despite ongoing economic tensions.
China tightened its export controls on rare-earth materials, a move that escalates the regulatory confrontation with Western de-risking efforts and underscores Beijing's use of its legal toolkit.
Shares of major Chinese semiconductor firms fell sharply as investors reacted to ongoing and proposed US and allied export restrictions on chipmaking tools and high-end processors, impacting profitability and capacity expansion.
China’s Ministry of Commerce sharply criticised the US Federal Communications Commission’s decision to add foreign-produced advanced robotic devices and power inverters to its “Covered List.” This move tightens US curbs on Chinese-made technologies, which Beijing views as discriminatory.
China's Ministry of Commerce condemned the UK government's nationalisation of Chinese-owned British Steel, labelling it discriminatory. Beijing stated the move violates market principles and politicises economic issues, warning of impacts on investor confidence.
The United States announced new import bans on certain Chinese industrial robots and power inverters. These measures are part of ongoing efforts to target Chinese advanced manufacturing capabilities and address economic security concerns.
China's Ministry of Commerce released a 10,000-character paper defending its industrial model and denying that its booming exports reflect harmful overcapacity. Beijing argues that Western accusations are politically motivated protectionism, laying groundwork for potential legal countermeasures.
Germany's government is conducting an informal exercise to identify Chinese dependencies on German and European technology, components, and industrial know-how. This aims to prepare leverage in case of an EU-China trade conflict, reflecting a shift towards adversarial contingency planning.
Beijing responded to US sanction threats against Moonshot by accusing US companies of "distilling" Chinese models and signaling potential reciprocal restrictions or retaliation against US tech firms operating in China.
Senior US officials publicly warned of possible sanctions against Chinese AI company Moonshot over alleged misuse of US foundation models, including Anthropic’s Claude, to train its Kimi chatbot. This marks a new front in technology-related regulatory confrontation.
A Chinese semiconductor manufacturer is preparing a 66.5 billion yuan (about €9.8 billion) capital raise on Shanghai’s Star Market, which would be Asia’s largest fundraising to date, driven by surging demand for AI-related chips.
China's Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong met FBI Director Kash Patel in Beijing, and both sides agreed to deepen cooperation in specific law enforcement fields, including counter-narcotics and anti-money-laundering. This engagement highlights a compartmentalised approach to bilateral relations.
China's Ministry of Commerce added 14 EU-based entities, including German defence group Rheinmetall AG, to its export control list. This move directly counters recent EU sanctions against Chinese and Hong Kong companies over Russia, prohibiting the supply of Chinese-origin dual-use items to these European firms.
The Trump administration replaced an expiring 10% global tariff with new levies of 10% and 12.5% on 60 trading partners, citing failures in forced labor enforcement. This action expands the scope of trade measures related to labor practices.
The European Commission fined Chinese e-commerce platform AliExpress for failing to tackle sales of illegal, unsafe, and counterfeit goods under the Digital Services Act, deepening Brussels' willingness to use regulatory tools against major Chinese firms.
The EU's new eco-design rules for textiles entered into force, banning large companies from destroying unsold or returned clothing and shoes. These regulations aim to extend product life cycles and reduce waste, affecting fast fashion supply chains heavily reliant on imports from Asia.
Chinese regulators significantly reinforced oversight of overseas transactions involving Chinese technology and data, giving Beijing broad powers to unwind completed deals and scrutinise foreign investments. These measures apply to AI models, critical software, and data-rich services, complicating Western de-risking efforts.
France and Germany announced they will develop a joint "roadmap" by September to address China's trade practices and export surpluses. The plan aims to strengthen the European Commission's mandate for market investigations and trade defence instruments.
French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced that Paris and Berlin will present a new roadmap for the EU’s China policy by September, aiming for coordinated EU-level instruments.
At a Franco-German ministerial council meeting, German CDU leader Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron presented a unified stance on China’s industrial overcapacity and exchange-rate policy, urging dialogue or a more flexible exchange rate. They advocated for tougher EU trade-defence instruments.
The UK government nationalised British Steel, owned by China's Jingye Group, citing national security, protection of critical industrial capacity, and safeguarding jobs. This action is viewed as an escalation in de-risking from China.
Beijing startup Moonshot unveiled its Kimi K3, a 2.8-trillion-parameter open AI model, which the company claims narrows the performance gap with top-tier US models on coding and complex tasks.
The European Commission approved €659 million in German state aid to support four semiconductor facilities, aiming to strengthen the EU’s autonomy in the sector and reduce dependence on East Asian supply chains.
The US President declassified intelligence claiming China illicitly acquired 220 million US voter records, ordering a new FBI investigation into the matter. This action introduces election integrity concerns into US-China relations.
The UK government took Chinese-owned British Steel into full public ownership, framing the move as necessary to protect national interests, jobs, and defence-linked supply chains, marking a direct state intervention in a strategic asset.
The UK government announced it will take British Steel into public ownership after its Chinese owner signalled plans to shut blast furnace capacity. Officials framed the move as necessary to protect domestic steel production, safeguard jobs, and ensure national supply for major infrastructure and defence projects.
Brussels is preparing further customs duties on Chinese-made plug-in hybrid vehicles, building on earlier investigations into alleged subsidies for Chinese EV manufacturers. This action targets specific hybrid models deemed to benefit from state support and threaten EU carmakers.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security shifted Nvidia H200 and AMD MI325X exports to China to case-by-case license review, following a previous agreement for export licenses in exchange for revenue sharing. This aims to give regulators tighter control over volumes and end-users.
The US Department of Commerce clarified its CHIPS Act guardrails, imposing long-term restrictions on semiconductor investment in China for companies receiving incentives. These rules aim to prevent significant expansion of manufacturing capacity in China for at least ten years.
China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs announced new temporary export controls on helium, a critical input for semiconductor manufacturing. This move aligns with Beijing's strategy of using export controls to respond to Western technology restrictions.
Péter Szijjártó, Hungary's former foreign minister, quit his parliamentary seat to join Chinese automaker BYD, underscoring the political pull of Chinese industrial investment in Europe. This highlights the continued embedding of Chinese firms in the European industrial landscape.
The EU's chief trade enforcement official indicated readiness to invoke safeguard measures, such as emergency tariffs and quotas, to respond to an "extraordinary" surge in Chinese exports, aiming to reduce the trade imbalance by October.
Nvidia removed dozens of entities in Singapore, Malaysia, and Japan from its 'whitelist' of customers for advanced chips, following stricter internal compliance checks linked to US export control reforms targeting China.
The United States, United Kingdom, and 12 other Western and Asian countries, along with the EU, issued statements reaffirming the 2016 Hague arbitral ruling that invalidated China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea.
China's Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs issued a joint order suspending all helium exports with immediate effect, tightening control over a critical input for semiconductors, medical imaging, and aerospace.
A bipartisan group of US lawmakers introduced the MATCH Act, a bill aimed at imposing stricter controls on exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China, including from allied nations like the Netherlands.
The US launched a third set of export controls on China’s semiconductor industry, restricting shipments to approximately 140 Chinese firms and tightening rules on high-bandwidth memory chips and advanced manufacturing equipment.
The US imposed new limits on the export of high-bandwidth memory chips, crucial for AI and advanced data processing, as part of efforts to constrain China's military modernization.
The US Commerce Department added approximately 140 Chinese technology companies to its Entity List, subjecting them to stringent export restrictions. This action targets chipmaking, fabrication equipment, and software sectors.
Chinese regulators met with major tech companies to discuss potential restrictions on overseas access to their most advanced AI models. Such limits would affect both proprietary and open-weight systems, impacting Western firms and research institutions that rely on Chinese-developed AI.
The European Union has removed the €150 customs duty exemption on low-value parcels from outside the bloc, introducing a flat €3 duty per item regardless of declared value. This change, approved in 2025, aims to tackle undervaluation and ensure a level playing field for EU sellers, impacting cross-border e-commerce.
China's new ethnic unity law entered into force, allowing legal action against individuals and groups outside its borders for alleged "undermining ethnic unity." This expands China's extraterritorial enforcement beyond economic regulations.
China's Foreign Relations Law entered into force, providing a broad legal basis for coordinating sanctions, blocking rules, and supply-chain security actions under a single political framework, explicitly linking them to Xi Jinping’s security and development doctrines.
The United States declined to extend the USMCA trade agreement, triggering a decade-long sunset period for North America’s economic framework. This decision will subject the agreement to annual review until 2036.
Parcels valued under €150 from non-EU countries are no longer exempt from customs duties, with a flat charge of €3 per item now applying to goods from platforms like Temu, Shein, and AliExpress.
Chinese regulators have begun investigations into foreign chipmakers that reduced sales to Chinese clients, citing April’s Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security and the 2021 anti-sanctions law framework.
Chinese authorities have warned local units of European chipmakers and high-tech suppliers against following EU and US semiconductor export controls, creating direct legal conflicts for companies. This action leverages China's Regulations on Countering Foreign Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.
Poland’s state postal operator has warned that the new EU customs rule, effective July 1, could be exploited by scammers sending fake SMS payment demands. The public is advised to be vigilant against 'smishing' attempts related to parcel deliveries.
The European Union has implemented a new customs rule, effective July 1, ending the duty-free threshold for packages under 150 euros from outside the bloc. This change aims to level the playing field for EU businesses and ensure fair taxation.
Chinese exports jumped 27% in dollar terms and imports climbed 36% in June, both exceeding analyst estimates. Car shipments topped 1 million units for the first time, indicating robust trade activity.
China's Ministry of Commerce issued additional prohibition orders under its blocking rules, barring entities in China from complying with recent US and EU export curbs on advanced semiconductor equipment. This expands on previous moves against US sanctions and an EU Foreign Subsidy Regulation case.
Chinese authorities invoked the Regulations on Countering Foreign Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to prevent a major wind turbine maker from cooperating with an EU anti-subsidy investigation, citing "illegal extraterritorial jurisdiction."
China expanded its export controls on dual-use items to Japan, blacklisting 20 additional companies and research bodies. This action drew a sharp protest from Tokyo, as Beijing cited a "remilitarisation push" for the measure.
Chinese regulators instructed a major industrial supplier not to cooperate with an EU anti-dumping probe and challenged clauses requiring EU export control compliance in contracts, creating "compliance collisions" for multinationals.
Beijing imposed immediate export restrictions on 20 Japanese entities, including Mitsubishi Shipbuilding, accusing Tokyo of pursuing a 'new type of militarism'. This action signals China's readiness to use trade tools in response to perceived security threats.
New reports detail expanded cooperation between China and Russia on semiconductor-adjacent and dual-use industrial technologies, including joint ventures in machine tools and chip packaging. This collaboration is explicitly framed as a response to US and EU export controls.
The United States expanded its semiconductor and AI export controls, which may lead to spill-over compliance conflicts for EU firms due to China's blocking rules.
NATO and EU officials have created a joint tasking mechanism to track China-Russia technology transfers, particularly in semiconductors and drone electronics, linking the move to de-risking and sanctions enforcement.
Beijing has expanded licensing or customs scrutiny on select semiconductor manufacturing equipment, specialty chemicals, and industrial software exports. This move targets recipients in the EU, US, Japan, and South Korea, raising concerns among European trade diplomats about flexible use of permits.
The EU adopted updated dual-use export control guidelines and a pilot outbound investment screening mechanism, focusing on advanced semiconductors, quantum, and AI. This move aims to prevent diversion to China's military-civil fusion programs.
China's commerce ministry added US rare earth miners MP Materials and USA Rare Earth, along with eight other US entities with defense links, to its export control list. This action effectively halts shipments of Chinese dual-use items to these companies.
China's Finance Ministry barred 46 US companies, primarily defense contractors, from participating in Chinese government procurement. This move was explicitly framed as retaliation for US security-driven trade measures, impacting sensitive supply chains.
Chinese authorities added ten American industrial suppliers, including rare earth miners and drone manufacturers, to an export control list. This action blocks shipments of dual-use items from China to those firms, retaliating for US security-driven trade measures.
The European Commission formally confirmed provisional anti-subsidy duties on Chinese EV imports, with rates up to 48%. This decision follows earlier preliminary findings and escalates trade tensions between the EU and China.
European business groups reported that Chinese regulators questioned or delayed approvals for EU manufacturers seeking to shift production from China. The Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security are now affecting corporate de-risking decisions.
Chinese authorities invoked the Regulations on Countering Foreign Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to prevent a domestic technology supplier from responding to an EU antitrust investigation. This marks the first reported use of these rules against an EU regulatory process.
China announced trade restrictions on dozens of US companies, including defense and aerospace firms, in retaliation for a Pentagon blacklist of Chinese entities. This action targets specific sectors in response to perceived foreign measures.
EU ambassadors reached a political agreement on the first tranche of the European Economic Security Strategy implementation measures, including tighter outbound investment screening and coordinated export controls for sensitive technologies.
The European Commission proposed a new 'diversification law' obliging EU companies to diversify sources of critical inputs. This initiative aims to reduce over-reliance on Chinese suppliers as part of its de-risking agenda.
Chinese authorities used the Regulations on Countering Foreign Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to block a Chinese telecoms equipment maker from complying with an EU anti-subsidy investigation, forcing the European Commission to rely on available facts.
Chinese regulators started enforcing new Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security, allowing sanctions against foreign companies that relocate manufacturing or reduce purchases from Chinese suppliers. These rules aim to penalize firms participating in Western 'de-risking' efforts.
China has started enforcing new industrial and supply-chain security rules that can penalize foreign firms for moving production out of China or reducing purchases from Chinese suppliers, making de-risking a regulatory risk.
G7 leaders adopted a 60% import ceiling for rare earths and permanent magnets from any single supplier outside the group. This move aims to reduce dependence on China following last year's export restrictions and establish a new minerals alliance.
China brought into force Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security, allowing penalties for foreign companies that relocate production or significantly reduce purchases from Chinese suppliers. These rules provide a formal basis for retaliation against de-risking policies.
Chinese authorities utilized the Regulations on Countering Foreign Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction for the first time against the EU, ordering a domestic 5G equipment producer not to comply with an EU anti-subsidy investigation. This action creates a blocking statute against EU enforcement.
Chinese authorities used the Regulations on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction for the first time to block an EU Foreign Subsidy Regulation investigation into a Chinese company. This action marks a shift towards a broader blocking regime against Western regulatory measures.
China's State Council published a new set of rules codifying procedures to identify 'improper' foreign laws and authorize bans on compliance, reinforcing its legal framework against Western extraterritorial actions. These measures complement existing anti-sanctions laws.
Chinese officials warned of countermeasures against the EU if proposed "Buy European" industrial legislation and new cybersecurity rules are not amended. Beijing argues these measures violate WTO obligations and amount to protectionism.
China's Ministry of Justice issued its first formal blocking order under the new Countering Foreign Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Regulations, prohibiting compliance with an EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation investigation into Nuctech. This action directly obstructs an EU enforcement procedure.
Implementation rules for China's Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, effective from 23 March, specify concrete counter-actions like asset freezes and entry bans. They notably extend potential restrictions into sectors including education, technology, legal services, and culture. This codified reach increases legal risk for firms complying with Western measures, sharpening the reciprocal regulatory conflict.
Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security, effective from April, grant Chinese authorities power to sanction foreign companies that relocate production or diversify away from Chinese suppliers. The rules allow for fines, blacklisting, and punishment of firms seen as cooperating with Western export controls. This directly targets the operational steps multinationals take to comply with US and EU de-risking policies.
In May, Beijing formally invoked its new countermeasures for the first time. It issued a prohibition order barring Chinese entities from cooperating with new US sanctions against five Chinese refineries. Separately, it used the Regulations on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to block cooperation with an EU Foreign Subsidy Regulation investigation into a Chinese firm. These moves mark a shift from symbolic countersanctions to direct, operational interference with third-party compliance.
China scales up efforts to build a renminbi-centred commodities and financial system, including digital RMB infrastructure and non-dollar payment arrangements. These initiatives are designed to reduce exposure to US/EU financial sanctions and support counter-measures, forming part of a coordinated 'financial lawfare' strategy.
Analysis highlights China's activation of its full anti-sanctions legal toolkit, including the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and Unreliable Entity List, to penalize companies that align with US or EU restrictions. Combined with new supply chain rules, this creates a legal environment where Western firms face direct retaliation in China for home-jurisdiction compliance.
Chinese regulators block Meta's acquisition of Chinese AI startup Manus, citing the new supply chain security regulations. The decision marks one of the first concrete applications of the framework, signalling that foreign M&A in sensitive tech sectors can be constrained by Beijing's anti-decoupling agenda.
The European Commission's provisional anti-subsidy tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles take effect, with duties on some models reaching approximately 38%. The Commission states the measures are a response to market distortions from state subsidies, while China labels them protectionist.
Chinese regulators have blocked Meta's planned acquisition of AI startup Manus, citing national security and the company's exposure to foreign sanctions. The case is seen as an early, high-profile application of Beijing's new legal tools to restrict foreign tech mergers and acquisitions.
China's recently enacted Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security are now being analyzed as a key countermeasure. The rules empower authorities to fine or blacklist foreign companies that reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains in response to Western policies, explicitly targeting compliance with foreign export controls.
In a direct response to the EU's EV tariffs, China's Ministry of Commerce has opened an anti-dumping investigation into imports of pork and pork by-products from the European Union. The probe, which could last up to 18 months, targets major exporters including Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France.
The European Commission has formally imposed provisional anti-subsidy duties on Chinese electric vehicles, with rates reaching 37.6% for manufacturers like BYD, SAIC, and Geely. The tariffs apply from 4 July and will remain provisional until at least November 2026, pending a final decision.
Analysts note that China's layered anti-sanctions legal framework, including the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and Unreliable Entity List, is designed to penalize foreign firms for complying with Western restrictions. This system directly challenges corporate compliance obligations, creating a legal conflict for multinationals in sectors like semiconductors and advanced manufacturing.
US led semiconductor export controls have intensified techno economic decoupling with China. In response, Beijing has expanded its own export control toolkit and stockpiling strategies for critical inputs. This reciprocal escalation heightens strategic uncertainty for European semiconductor equipment suppliers and electronics producers caught between multiple regulatory regimes.
Analysis indicates China has consolidated instruments like the Anti Foreign Sanctions Law, Export Control Law, and Unreliable Entity List into a system designed to deter foreign firms from implementing Western sanctions. This framework, combined with new supply chain rules, increases the likelihood of direct legal conflict for multinationals between Western and Chinese compliance obligations.
The European Commission's provisional anti subsidy tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, of up to around 38%, are now in effect. A full implementation decision is expected by November 2026. Brussels states the duties counter unfair state support, while Beijing condemns them as protectionist and linked to Western 'decoupling'.
Chinese regulators have started applying the Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security, adopted in April, to warn and potentially penalize foreign firms. The rules target companies seen as 'cooperating' with foreign export controls or sanctions by relocating production or reducing Chinese content. European and Japanese automakers and electronics groups have reportedly received informal regulatory guidance.
The US Department of Defense updated its list of Chinese companies allegedly supporting Beijing's military, adding e-commerce giant Alibaba, search engine Baidu, and automaker BYD. The move, following the recent Trump-Xi summit, risks further inflaming tensions and provides a contextual backdrop of escalating US-China friction that parallels the EU's trade actions.
Analyses confirm China has integrated its anti-foreign sanctions law, unreliable entities list, and new supply chain regulations into a coordinated framework. The regime now treats corporate actions taken to comply with US or EU export controls or due-diligence regimes as potential threats to China's national security, exposing firms to liability. This represents a formalized legal response designed to deter cooperation with Western de-risking policies.
The European Commission's provisional anti-subsidy tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, ranging up to roughly 38%, have taken effect. Beijing has responded with counter-investigations into EU-made cars and stated it will use its new supply chain security framework to scrutinize European firms that adjust sourcing to circumvent the EU tariffs. Trade lawyers warn companies now face parallel risks of fines in both jurisdictions.
Chinese regulators have begun active enforcement of the April 2026 Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security. Several large EU-based manufacturers, particularly German firms in autos and electronics, have received informal 'guidance visits' warning that further diversification of production or sourcing away from China could trigger investigations. The rules allow for fines, export license restrictions, and blacklisting of firms deemed to be 'maliciously relocating' or cooperating with foreign sanctions against China.
Chinese authorities have begun applying new industrial and supply chain security regulations. These rules allow for penalties, including fines and supply chain blacklisting, against foreign firms that reduce procurement of Chinese components or relocate production to comply with US or EU policies.