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The strategic de-risking of Western economies from China has escalated into a reciprocal regulatory conflict, where China's new legal countermeasures directly target corporate compliance with Western policies, forcing a more complex and adversarial reassessment of economic dependencies.

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In the absence of new, high-profile legislative actions from either the EU or China in recent weeks, the de-risking conflict appears to be in a phase of operational digestion. Corporations and member state authorities are focused on implementing and interpreting the existing, contradictory frameworks on outbound investment screening and anti-sanctions rules. This lull does not signify resolution but rather a tactical pause, as all sides assess the economic and diplomatic impact of the current standoff.
The reciprocal regulatory conflict remains in a state of operational stasis. The core compliance trap, where EU outbound investment screening directly contradicts China's anti-sanctions rules, continues to paralyze strategic corporate planning. No new major escalatory measures have been reported from Brussels, Washington, or Beijing in this cycle, suggesting a tactical pause. Legal departments across European multinationals navigate the zero-sum choice between jurisdictions in a holding pattern. The incremental recalibration of dependencies continues quietly, with member states reviewing specific port investments and infrastructure funding. The primary corporate consequence is a sustained freeze on long-term strategic investment decisions across critical sectors, as the policy landscape offers no new clarity.
The immediate past month saw no announcements of new unilateral tariffs, export controls, or legal countermeasures from the EU, US, or Chinese governments. This marks a period of tactical pause following the implementation of the core conflicting regulations.
The reporting period ended without verifiable new developments in the reciprocal regulatory conflict. No fresh announcements on tariffs, export controls, or investment screening were recorded from the EU, US, or Chinese authorities, maintaining the existing state of policy stasis.
The European Commission is developing a legislative proposal for an EU-level mechanism to screen and potentially restrict outbound investments in sensitive technologies like semiconductors and AI, with China identified as a primary risk. Member states like the Netherlands and Italy express support but voice concerns over administrative burdens.
China's Commerce Ministry has updated and activated rules under its Unreliable Entity List, explicitly stating that companies which cut off supplies to Chinese entities to follow foreign sanctions or export controls (including those from the EU and US) can face fines, bans, and asset freezes.
Enforcement of China's expanded Anti-Espionage Law has increased, with police inspections, data seizures, and staff questioning targeting foreign risk advisory and supply-chain auditing firms. EU business groups warn this creates a direct conflict with Western compliance mandates.
The European Commission's investigation into Chinese wind turbine manufacturers has formally widened to gather evidence on not only subsidies but also potential risks to the security of supply for grid-critical components, affecting projects in Spain, Greece, and the Baltic states.
EU institutions have concluded a political agreement on a new framework to screen outbound investments in sensitive technologies like advanced semiconductors, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence. The mechanism will require large EU companies and investment funds to notify authorities of high-risk investments in third countries, with China explicitly cited as the primary area of concern. Legal experts warn this directly pits EU compliance against China's anti-foreign sanctions laws, creating a legal dilemma for firms.
China's Ministry of Commerce issued new implementing rules for its Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and Unreliable Entity List. The rules explicitly widen their scope to penalise foreign firms that 'discriminate' against Chinese partners by adhering to foreign export or investment controls, such as the new EU screening regime. European corporate counsel state this significantly raises the risk that following EU or US rules could result in asset freezes, fines, or entry bans in China.
Following its investigation, the European Commission has signalled it will impose definitive anti-subsidy duties on Chinese-made electric vehicles, citing persistent market distortion from state support. Beijing condemned the decision and threatened counter-measures on European exports, hinting at using its anti-sanctions toolkit. Analysts note the EV case is a testbed for de-risking, with automakers assessing if local production in China can offer protection from future regulatory shocks.
The European Commission has formally imposed provisional tariffs of up to around 30–35% on imports of Chinese-made electric vehicles. The duties, applied on top of the existing 10% car import tariff, are a direct result of the anti-subsidy investigation into companies like BYD, SAIC, and Geely. This action represents the EU's most significant step from de-risking rhetoric into active trade defense, with immediate repercussions for the automotive market and related battery supply chains.
In a swift response to the EU's EV tariffs, China's Commerce Ministry opened an anti-dumping investigation into pork and pork by-product imports from the European Union. The probe targets key suppliers like Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France, directly impacting politically sensitive agricultural constituencies within the EU. The move is widely seen as a calibrated retaliatory action, signaling Beijing's intent to respond in kind to trade measures.
The US Treasury has issued final rules for its outbound investment screening program, creating mandatory notification and prohibition requirements for certain US investments in Chinese artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and advanced semiconductors. This extends Washington's tech containment toolkit beyond export controls into the realm of capital flows, putting pressure on European allies to consider similar measures and raising compliance risks for multinationals under China's counter-sanctions laws.
China's Commerce Ministry has added several foreign consultancies and due-diligence firms to its unreliable entities list. Concurrently, new enforcement guidance under the revised Anti-Espionage Law clarifies that routine corporate data-gathering on supply chains may be deemed sensitive. These actions significantly raise legal and compliance uncertainty for European companies, creating direct conflicts with their obligations under Western sanctions and export control regimes.
The EU, US, and G7 partners advance towards tighter coordination on outbound investment screening and export controls targeting advanced semiconductors and dual-use technologies, with the EU explicitly framing its draft mechanism as a response to China's national security laws.
China reinforces its countermeasure toolkit, including the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and unreliable entities list, to create a 'reciprocal legal architecture' designed to penalize foreign firms for complying with Western de-risking policies and deter strict alignment with controls.
The US refines its semiconductor export controls, closing loopholes and expanding licensing requirements, while actively pressing European and Asian allies for closer alignment on restricting advanced lithography and logic chips to China.
The EU moves toward definitive tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and batteries, prompting formal WTO complaints and retaliatory threats from China, escalating a trade dispute seen as a litmus test for the limits of de-risking.
Deepening China-Russia coordination in energy, minerals, and industrial inputs creates an alternative economic axis, complicating Western de-risking strategies by providing Beijing with buffers against sanctions and supply-chain controls.
The European Commission imposes provisional countervailing duties on Chinese electric vehicles, with rates ranging from the mid-teens to over 30% for specific manufacturers, following its anti-subsidy investigation.
China's Ministry of Commerce retaliates against the EU's EV tariffs by launching anti-dumping investigations into imports of EU pork and dairy products, signalling a tit-for-tat use of trade defence instruments.
Chinese authorities intensify enforcement of the expanded Anti-Espionage Law, with new guidance broadening the scope of sensitive data, increasing legal risks for foreign firms conducting due diligence or supply-chain audits.
The US finalises rules for screening outbound investment in advanced semiconductors, quantum computing, and AI, while the European Commission proposes a parallel EU-wide framework, aligning efforts to prevent capital and know-how from fueling China's military-civil fusion.
China expands its unreliable entities list and tightens export controls on selected critical materials, explicitly framing the moves as countermeasures to Western sanctions and warning foreign firms against 'discriminatory' compliance.
Facing the crossfire of conflicting regulations, major European manufacturers in autos, chemicals, and machinery are accelerating a dual operational strategy. They are deepening localisation and automation within China to serve that market ('in-China-for-China') while simultaneously building parallel production capacity in Southeast Asia, India, and the EU ('China-plus-one'). This costly bifurcation is becoming a default risk-management template to hedge against supply chain disruptions from escalating regulatory conflict.
The European Commission has opened an investigation into alleged unfair Chinese subsidies for wind turbine manufacturers competing in European tenders. This extends the recent series of trade disputes beyond solar panels and electric vehicles into another critical clean-tech sector, increasing compliance uncertainty for European utilities and project developers.
The European Commission has formally applied provisional countervailing duties on imports of Chinese-made electric vehicles. The tariffs, which vary by manufacturer, are levied on top of the existing 10% car duty. Brussels argues that unfair state subsidies are harming EU producers. China's Commerce Ministry condemned the move as protectionist, signaling a clear escalation in bilateral trade tensions.
In a direct response to the EU's EV tariffs, China's Commerce Ministry has opened an anti-dumping investigation into pork and pork by-products from the European Union. The probe targets major exporters including Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, and Germany. European officials view this as a calibrated retaliation aimed at politically influential farming sectors within the EU.
The European Commission has unveiled a legislative proposal to create an EU-wide framework for screening outbound investments in sensitive technologies, with a focus on transactions involving China. The plan targets advanced semiconductors, quantum computing, and certain AI applications to prevent the transfer of critical know-how. This move aligns the EU more closely with existing US controls.
The Dutch government has updated its export licensing regime for advanced chipmaking equipment, imposing further restrictions on shipments by firms like ASML to Chinese customers. The new measures, coordinated with the US and Japan, broaden the scope of controlled tools. Beijing criticized the move as an abuse of export controls.
China and Russia have announced new cooperation agreements on the supply and processing of critical minerals, including rare earths and battery metals. The deals are framed as a response to Western economic 'containment' and aim to secure inputs for electric vehicles and defence industries, potentially complicating Western de-risking strategies.
Following China's anti-dumping investigation, France and Spain have called on the European Commission to prepare support measures for affected farmers and explore a WTO-compatible response. This highlights the domestic political pressures within the EU as member states face sector-specific retaliation from China.
In an update to its Indo-Pacific strategy, the European External Action Service stated that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are of direct security and economic interest to the EU. Several European navies have increased freedom of navigation operations in the region, reflecting how security concerns are being integrated into Europe's economic risk calculus regarding China.
Following the formal initiation of its review, EU institutions are now developing concrete policy options to address the dual-compliance risks created by China's Industrial and Supply Chain Security Law. The work focuses on sectoral risk assessments and potential support mechanisms for companies caught in the crossfire.
The European Commission has intensified work on sectoral risk assessments for semiconductors, critical raw materials, and advanced manufacturing, aiming to propose concrete countermeasures by end-2026. China's supply chain law is cited as creating immediate legal uncertainty for firms caught between EU and Chinese compliance demands.
The Commission and key member states are examining a bloc-wide tool to restrict capital and know-how flows into advanced Chinese sectors like chips and AI. This initiative is a direct response to China's new legal framework, aiming to prevent regulatory arbitrage and protect firms from conflicting compliance demands.
Beyond provisional tariffs, EU authorities are developing a framework combining anti-subsidy duties, subsidy transparency rules, and enhanced investment screening. This is linked to concerns that China's supply chain law could be used to pressure Chinese firms to bypass EU investigations or controls.
Multinationals warn that China's law creates direct conflicts with Western sanctions, export controls, and due-diligence rules. Cases include pressure over supplier diversification from Xinjiang and data-sharing obligations. Business groups are calling for EU-level 'blocking' measures and coordinated diplomacy.
The European Commission finalises a legislative proposal for an EU-wide outbound investment screening mechanism, targeting capital and technology flows in sensitive sectors like semiconductors, AI, and quantum to China.
EU trade officials finalise the structure for a long-term tariff regime on Chinese electric vehicles, moving beyond provisional duties to a tiered system with potential exemptions for EU-based production.
The EU, US, Japan, and South Korea establish a formal working group on semiconductor export control alignment, focusing on advanced lithography tools and AI-grade chips, marking a step towards institutionalised coordination.
The European Commission has unveiled draft legislation to screen and potentially restrict outbound investments in critical technologies like advanced semiconductors, AI, quantum, and biotech. Officials explicitly describe it as a 'symmetrical' response to China's own supply chain security and anti-espionage laws, aiming to prevent EU capital and know-how from enhancing a rival's military capabilities. While several member states support the principle, concerns persist about administrative burdens and the risk of Chinese retaliation.
EU finance ministers have approved a new, permanent anti-subsidy and anti-dumping tariff framework for electric vehicles, designed to automatically address price distortions linked to state support. While formally country-agnostic, the system is calibrated to capture Chinese subsidies and will allow for faster annual adjustments. China's Commerce Ministry has denounced the move as discriminatory and hinted at countermeasures against EU agriculture and luxury goods.
Beijing has brought into force new regulations under its national security framework, expanding state oversight of foreign-invested companies in key sectors like semiconductors and EV batteries. Firms deemed significant to national supply chain security must now submit detailed localisation and contingency plans and can be ordered to prioritise domestic users during crises. European corporate counsel warn this directly clashes with Western de-risking policies, creating a legal trap for multinationals.
In a clear retaliatory move, China's Commerce Ministry has added several Western companies to its unreliable entities list and broadened export controls on gallium, germanium, and rare-earth products. The designations target firms complying with Western sanctions, explicitly linking enforcement to adherence to 'discriminatory' foreign measures. The paired actions increase uncertainty for European manufacturers dependent on these critical Chinese inputs.
The Chinese government has adopted the 'Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security,' granting authorities broad powers to sanction foreign companies that relocate manufacturing out of China or comply with Western export controls and sanctions. The rules explicitly aim to undercut EU and US de-risking strategies by threatening to exclude compliant firms from Chinese supply chains and imposing other penalties.
Chinese officials are warning the European Union and its companies of potential retaliation under the new Chinese regulations if they pursue the supply chain diversification goals outlined in the EU's recently unveiled industrial policy. This pressure campaign aims to dilute the EU's country-neutral instrument, widely seen as targeting Chinese overcapacity and dependencies.
The European Commission and key member states launch a coordinated review of critical dependencies on China, explicitly factoring in the new risk of Chinese legal retaliation against firms complying with EU de-risking policies.
The Commission's assessment is shifting from abstract risk to concrete legal exposure for European firms, marking a new phase in the reciprocal regulatory conflict.
In direct response to China's new Industrial and Supply Chain Security Law, the European Commission and key member states have initiated a coordinated review. The aim is to systematically map sectoral vulnerabilities and potential retaliation channels, feeding into ongoing work on the EU's Economic Security Strategy.
The law, in effect since April, empowers Chinese regulators to penalize corporate decisions—like supplier diversification or production shifts—that align with Western de-risking policies. This formalizes the legal risk for firms caught between competing jurisdictions.
Analysts note the conflict has evolved from policy divergence to a reciprocal tightening, where Western de-risking tools and Chinese countermeasures (like the supply chain law) are used to coercively influence corporate location and sourcing decisions, entrenching the split.
Building on previous restrictions, China has further tightened export controls on rare earth elements and other minerals critical for EVs and advanced electronics. This strengthens Beijing's ability to use supply chains as leverage in response to Western de-risking, complicating diversification efforts.
Beijing has enacted new rules empowering regulators to sanction or exclude from supply chains any foreign company that shifts manufacturing out of China or complies with Western export controls and sanctions. Analysts describe the move as a direct countermeasure designed to undermine EU and member-state de-risking efforts.
The European Commission has detailed a new Industrial Accelerator-type Instrument aimed at reducing the bloc's strategic dependencies, a move catalyzed by a surge of low-priced Chinese exports like EVs. While not explicitly naming China, the tool is designed to counter unfair competition from subsidized firms.
Major automakers like Volkswagen, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz are caught between EU pressure to de-risk and new Chinese threats to penalize production shifts. Their substantial reliance on the Chinese market and exports from Chinese plants puts them directly in the crosshairs of the escalating regulatory conflict.
In response to Beijing's tightened export controls on gallium, germanium, and graphite, EU officials are advancing a mix of diversification partnerships, investment guarantees, and potential defensive trade tools under the Critical Raw Materials Act, focusing on securing upstream supply chains.
The US and EU are coordinating on updates to advanced semiconductor export controls targeting AI accelerators and manufacturing equipment, with EU states showing increased willingness to mirror parts of the US regime, particularly for tools produced in the Netherlands and Germany.
New Chinese rules on cross-border data transfers and counter-sanctions enforcement create significant compliance risks for multinationals relocating production or adhering to Western sanctions, forcing some EU firms to consider more autonomous local entities for their Chinese operations.
Brussels and national capitals are intensifying scrutiny of BRI-linked port, rail, and logistics projects using foreign-subsidy and security-screening regulations to limit strategic dependencies and prevent the corridors from being used to bypass EU sanctions.
Expanded use of local currencies and alternative logistics between China and Russia is seen in European capitals as increasing re-export risks for sensitive goods, reinforcing arguments for tighter outbound investment screening and controls in third countries.
Renewed military activity around Taiwan is prompting EU member states to commission stress tests on semiconductor and shipping disruptions, feeding directly into de-risking agendas for geographic diversification and strategic stockpiling.
The European Commission formally adopts additional tariffs of up to ~38% on imports of Chinese-made electric vehicles, confirming provisional duties applied in mid-2025. The move, a direct outcome of the anti-subsidy investigation, is framed as a defensive measure against excess industrial capacity and unfair competition.
China expands its anti-espionage law and tightens data regulations, significantly increasing compliance risks and legal uncertainty for Western firms operating in or with China. The move is widely interpreted as a counter-leverage tactic against Western de-risking policies.
Brussels advances plans to broaden and harmonize foreign direct investment screening across the bloc, with a heightened focus on Chinese stakes in critical infrastructure like ports, energy grids, and telecoms, reflecting a coordinated push to limit security-sensitive acquisitions.
No significant new policy announcements, tariff implementations, or major corporate shifts related to EU-China de-risking have been recorded in the last 30 days, indicating a potential lull or digestion period following the recent wave of enforcement actions.
The European Union's definitive anti-subsidy duties on Chinese-made electric vehicles have entered into force, replacing provisional measures with tariffs of up to 38%. The European Commission describes this as a targeted de-risking action against unfair subsidies. In response, China's Commerce Ministry has condemned the move as protectionist and signaled it is preparing a formal complaint to the World Trade Organization, alongside potential retaliatory measures against EU exports. European automakers with significant production in China are now urgently reassessing their pricing and supply chain strategies for the EU market.
The European Commission has formally launched an anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese wind turbine manufacturers participating in tenders across several EU member states. Using powers under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, the probe examines allegations of below-cost bids and state-backed financing that could distort the EU's renewables market. While wind developers warn of potential project delays and increased costs, EU officials argue the investigation is necessary to de-risk the green energy supply chain and protect the bloc's industrial base.
In a move widely seen as direct retaliation for the EU's EV tariffs, China has initiated an anti-dumping investigation into imports of pork and certain dairy products from the European Union. The probe threatens major exporters in Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France, potentially leading to punitive duties within a year. The European Commission has stated it will defend its producers through WTO channels while maintaining that its own EV measures are compliant with international trade rules and focused on de-risking.
EU member states have endorsed a revised framework to significantly strengthen and harmonize the bloc's screening of foreign direct investment, with a clear focus on China-linked deals. The updated rules expand the scope of sensitive sectors to include advanced batteries, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and critical port logistics. It also encourages scrutiny of minority stakes. Following this agreement, national authorities in Italy, the Netherlands, and Czechia have moved to update their own laws, signaling a more unified European de-risking stance on strategic acquisitions.
China expands its anti-dumping investigation into EU pork to include a wider range of processed meat and offal products, increasing pressure on European agricultural exporters.
The European Commission and German government coordinate to tighten export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment destined for China, aligning with US-led restrictions.
Following Italy's exit, the Belt and Road Initiative faces broader EU scrutiny, with member states like Greece, Croatia, and Slovenia delaying or restructuring Chinese-backed infrastructure projects under the updated investment screening framework.
France and the Netherlands announce stricter national investment screening rules targeting China-linked deals in strategic tech sectors, aligning their regimes with the broader EU economic security strategy.
The European Union formally adopts additional anti-subsidy tariffs, averaging around 37.6%, on imports of Chinese electric vehicles, following a member state vote. The decision, a major pillar of the bloc's de-risking strategy, aims to protect the European auto industry from what it deems unfair subsidized competition.
China escalates its trade dispute with the EU by expanding an anti-dumping investigation to include European dairy products and spirits. The move is explicitly linked by Beijing to the EU's recent actions on EVs and wind turbines, targeting key agricultural exports from member states like Denmark, Ireland, Spain, and France.
Germany issues detailed implementing regulations for tighter export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, aligning national practice with EU and allied restrictions aimed at China. The rules specify licensing requirements for lithography and other high-end tools, prioritizing security and transatlantic alignment over immediate commercial interests.
Italy allows the final remaining MoUs and pilot projects linked to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expire without renewal, completing its formal exit from the framework. Officials state future infrastructure cooperation with China will proceed on a case-by-case basis consistent with EU priorities like the Global Gateway.
China and Russia announce an expanded cooperation framework on critical minerals, including joint exploration and processing projects for rare earths and battery metals. The move is framed as a direct response to Western export controls and aims to build a more resilient supply chain less vulnerable to Western de-risking measures.
The European Commission initiates a formal probe into Chinese wind turbine makers active in several member states, citing concerns over state-subsidized underpricing and risks to European industrial resilience. This follows similar actions on EVs and solar panels, framing the move as part of the broader de-risking agenda.
The US Commerce Department updates its rules, adding restrictions on advanced chip packaging technologies and lowering performance thresholds for AI accelerators destined for China. The move aims to curb China's military-AI capabilities, with Chinese authorities signaling a retaliatory response on critical minerals.
Member states agree politically on a strengthened mechanism for screening foreign direct investment, extending scrutiny to a broader range of critical infrastructure and advanced technologies. The update, while country-neutral, is explicitly linked by officials to de-risking from China and concerns over strategic asset leverage.
Berlin releases a revised strategy document that strengthens language on reducing critical dependencies but stops short of bans or hard targets. It commits to more active use of EU tools while affirming China as a vital partner, reflecting the persistent tension between political de-risking goals and corporate practice.
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway announce a coordinated plan to develop mining, refining, and recycling capacity for rare earths and battery metals. The initiative is a concrete, regional step to reduce dependence on Chinese processing for clean-tech supply chains.
Following its investigation, the European Union has formally set long-term, producer-specific tariffs on Chinese-made EVs to counteract alleged unfair state subsidies. The move is framed as protecting the single market and reducing dependence on subsidised clean-tech imports. Beijing has condemned the decision and warned of potential retaliation.
Brussels has initiated a probe targeting Chinese suppliers participating in wind farm tenders across several EU member states. This extends the use of the foreign-subsidies toolkit to another strategic green-tech sector, aiming to preserve domestic industrial capacity in renewables.
The updated regime, entering into force, widens the list of sensitive sectors, enhances information-sharing between national authorities, and sets firmer deadlines for EU-level opinions. It is explicitly designed to address gaps exposed by past Chinese investments in critical infrastructure.
A survey by the EU Chamber of Commerce in China indicates that the vast majority of European companies are not retreating from the Chinese market. 68% are maintaining or expanding operations, with only 7% relocating production. This highlights that for many firms, de-risking is being interpreted as supply chain diversification while deepening roots in China, not as decoupling.
The Department of Commerce has refined performance thresholds for AI-relevant processors, extended controls to additional data-centre configurations, and aligned measures more closely with allies. The goal is to close loopholes in shipments of advanced chips and chipmaking equipment.
Following the updated export controls, Washington is consulting with key Asian allies on aligning licence policies and monitoring re-exports. European chip-equipment makers express concern about being drawn into a US-led regime without full consultation.
The two countries are increasing trade in discounted oil and gas, settled increasingly in yuan and via non-SWIFT platforms. This move is seen as a countermeasure to mitigate the impact of Western de-risking policies and sanctions.
The EU finalises its outbound investment screening regime, requiring companies to notify Brussels of planned investments in sensitive tech sectors like advanced semiconductors and AI in third countries, with China named as a key focus.
China and Serbia have deepened their strategic partnership, agreeing to cooperate on political, security, Belt and Road infrastructure, and AI. Analysts note this creates a 'strategic corridor' that could allow Chinese capital and technology indirect access to the EU market, posing a challenge to the bloc's de-risking and sanctions enforcement efforts.
China tightens export licensing for several chip-related materials and manufacturing chemicals, a move seen as a calibrated response to Western tech controls, increasing costs and lead times for EU manufacturers in electronics and automotive sectors.
China expands its Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law to explicitly penalise Chinese entities that cooperate with foreign outbound investment screening or export-control regimes, creating a direct legal conflict for EU firms required to notify Brussels.
Italy and Greece, under EU and NATO pressure, signal heightened security screening for future large-scale Chinese investments in strategic ports like Trieste and Piraeus, demanding stronger transparency and data-governance guarantees.
Several Central and Eastern European EU states, including Hungary and Croatia, reassess Chinese-backed infrastructure projects, seeking alternative EU funding and adapting projects to comply with EU rules to reduce dependence and limit political backlash.
China's State Council formally adopts the 'Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security', creating a legal basis to investigate and penalise foreign firms for actions deemed to threaten security, including relocating production or complying with foreign export controls.
China's Industrial and Supply Chain Security Law enters into force, granting authorities broad powers to investigate and potentially penalise foreign firms for supply chain decisions deemed to undermine China's 'security and stability'.
The new law grants Chinese regulators broad powers to scrutinize and potentially penalize actions by companies—including foreign multinationals—that are seen as weakening the stability of China's industrial and supply chains. This explicitly includes moves to diversify production or sourcing away from China.